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Abstract
In the aftermath of natural disasters, governments frequently provide financial aid
for affected households. This policy can have adverse effects if individuals anticipate
it and forgo private precaution measures. While theoretical literature unequivocally
suggests this so called “charity hazard”, empirical studies yield ambiguous results.
Drawing on rich survey data from German homeowners, we analyze charity hazard
for different flood precaution strategies, namely insurance uptake and non-financial
protection measures, and different flood risk areas. Our results indicate a substantial
charity hazard in the insurance market for individuals residing in flood-prone areas.
In contrast, we find a positive correlation between governmental aid and non-financial
protection measures. Moreover, our results suggest that insurance and non-financial
protection measures are rather complements than substitutes. Finally, we provide sug-
gestive evidence that status-quo bias might play an important role for insurance up-
take.
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1 Introduction
Natural disasters such as earthquakes, storms, and floods cause tremendous per-
sonal and economic damages each year worldwide. For the year 2016 alone, the eco-
nomic damage is estimated at 175 billion US$, of which the largest part was caused by
floods (Munich RE, 2017). In the wake of natural disasters, governments repeatedly
decide to provide financial aid for affected households to cover at least parts of the
costs.1 Although this policy intervention might be well-intentioned, it can have ad-
verse effects in the long run if such governmental relief triggers the so called “charity
hazard”, i.e. the tendency of individuals at risk not to procure insurance or other pre-
cautionary measures as a result of a reliance on expected charity from others (Browne
& Hoyt, 2000).
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of private flood insurance up-
take and of the implementation of non-financial protection measures, particularly fo-
cusing on the existence of charity hazard. We draw on survey data from German
homeowners (6,100 observations) and differentiate by an objective measure of flood
risk. Germany is a prime example to analyze the existence of charity hazard, since
catastrophic flood events and ex-post governmental relief regularly occur, for instance,
after the floods of 2002 and 2013, which caused approximately 9.7 and 8.7 billion US$
damage, respectively (Schwarze & Wagner, 2004; Thieken et al., 2016). Moreover, in
contrast to many other countries, private flood insurance is generally available, but
not mandatory in Germany.
Theoretical literature unequivocally suggests charity hazard in the market for nat-
ural disaster insurance and other precautionary measures (see Section 2), whereas em-
pirical studies are not only limited, but also yield ambiguous results. While some
studies find evidence for charity hazard (e.g. Botzen & van den Bergh, 2012a, 2012b),
others cannot confirm the theoretical results (e.g. Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Petrolia et al.,
2013, 2015).
1Examples include the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (Kousky, 2017), German flood
relief funds (Thieken et al., 2016), and similar assistance programs in Australia (Lo, 2013).
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We contribute to the literature by analyzing unique data that enables us to inves-
tigate the topic comprehensively, and thus to shed light on the existing ambiguous
results. Specifically, we are the first that have information on an objective measure of
flood risk, and on both the uptake of flood insurance as well as (behavioral and tech-
nical) non-financial flood protection measures, such as the installation of back flow
flaps.
We are thus able to conduct a differentiated analysis of charity hazard that can re-
veal heterogeneous effects of governmental aid on households in different flood risk
areas and for different flood precaution strategies. In many countries, such as Ger-
many, governments often provide financial aid exclusively for those households that
are not insured. Accordingly, even if households trust in financial aid from the gov-
ernment in case of a catastrophic flood, they can additionally conduct non-financial
protection measures without loosing the chance to benefit from the aid. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the effect of trusting in governmental aid is different for the uptake of
insurances and the implementation of non-financial protection measures. Specifically,
we anticipate that governmental aid and private flood insurance act as substitutes and
thus cause charity hazard, while governmental aid and non-financial protection mea-
sures might be regarded as complements. Furthermore, we expect that charity hazard
is more pronounced in regions that are at risk from flooding.
In addition, we shed some light on the question as to whether there exists a moral
hazard problem of insured households that do not implement further non-financial
protection measures (e.g. Hudson et al., 2017) and whether there is a status-quo bias
for insurance uptake, i.e. the tendency to remain in the insurance status, even though
legal compulsion ceased to apply. Evidence for status-quo bias was previously found
in the market for health insurance (Frank & Lamiraud, 2009; Krieger & Felder, 2013;
Salkeld et al., 2000) and automobile liability insurance (Johnson et al., 1993), but is
scarce for natural disaster insurance.
Our results provide evidence that there is substantial effect heterogeneity of gov-
ernmental aid on households in different flood risk areas and for different flood pre-
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caution strategies. While we find a positive correlation between trust in governmental
relief and the implementation of non-financial protection measures, the results for in-
surance uptake differ depending on flood exposure. Individuals living in flood-prone
areas and trusting in financial aid from the government are less likely to purchase
flood insurance. On the contrary, for individuals who face a low objective flood risk,
we do not find a robust relation between trust in governmental aid and insurance
uptake. Our results therefore suggest that a charity hazard exists for the uptake of
insurance if the household faces an objective flood risk. Furthermore, our results in-
dicate that governmental aid and non-financial protection measures are complements,
and in line with previous empirical literature, we find a positive correlation between
insurance uptake and non-financial protection measures, which relaxes concerns over
moral hazard in the flood insurance market (e.g. Hudson et al., 2017). Finally, we
provide first suggestive evidence that status-quo bias might play an important role
for the uptake of flood insurance. Altogether, our findings contribute to an improved
understanding of the existing mixed empirical results regarding charity hazard.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a short overview of the
existing theoretical and empirical literature on charity hazard. Subsequently, Section
3 introduces our data set and outlines our empirical strategy. Results are depicted in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature Review
Although the term “charity hazard” was first mentioned by Browne & Hoyt (2000),
the underlying processes and implications were already analyzed in the seminal works
of Buchanan (1975) and Coate (1995). The former work describes the “Samaritan’s
dilemma” in which assistance to a person in need decreases the recipient’s incentives
to improve its situation in the long term. Coate (1995) presents a setting in which the
rich, represented by the government, provide assistance to the poor, who face a possi-
ble loss. The model shows that in case of unconditional assistance the poor will forgo
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costly insurance.
Further studies have analyzed charity hazard in the specific context of natural haz-
ard protection measures. Raschky & Weck-Hannemann (2007) postulate that the more
institutionalized the relief is, the more pronounced charity hazard is. Importantly, they
also mention that as a consequence of the diminishing demand due to charity hazard,
insurance companies may be forced to either exit the market or to increase premiums,
which leads to more consumers forgoing insurance and a further weakened market (cf.
“disaster syndrome”: Kunreuther, 1996; Schwarze & Wagner, 2004). Importantly, these
and other theoretical works ( Lewis & Nickerson, 1989; Kelly & Kleffner, 2003; Arvan
& Nickerson, 2006) have the finding in common that unconditional post-disaster relief
undermines incentives to insure or to implement further precautionary measures.
In contrast to the unequivocal conclusions of the theoretical literature, empirical
studies show a mixed picture regarding the existence and strength of charity hazard.
Table 1 presents an overview of the main findings of empirical studies in the context
of flood and wind insurance as well as non-financial protection measures at the house-
hold level.2
The review yields several main insights: First, the data base is relatively small. The
three studies of Botzen et al. (2009) and Botzen & van den Bergh (2012a, 2012b) use
the same data set, as do both publications of Petrolia et al. (2013, 2015). Second, it
seems difficult to confirm the – theoretically well-reasoned – charity hazard in empiri-
cal data. Although slightly more works suggest a negative effect of government relief
on insurance uptake or protection measures, the evidence is far from clear. While most
authors who find a negative relationship interpret this result straightforward as an in-
2In addition to the studies presented in Table 1, some works are loosely connected to this strand of
literature. Brunette et al. (2013) analyze charity hazard in a non-incentivized laboratory experiment
and find a significant negative effect of governmental aid on the willingness to insure. Berlemann et
al. (2015) analyze household savings after a major flood in Germany. They find a negative effect of
flood experience on savings and interpret this as the reaction to government relief payments, referring
to the Samaritan’s dilemma. Furthermore, a small body of literature analyzes the charity hazard in the
agricultural sector (e.g. van Asseldonk et al., 2002; Liesivaara & Myyrä, 2014; Deryugina & Kirwan
2016).
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Table 1: Overview of empirical studies on charity hazard
Effect of
Study Sample and location Dependent variable governmental aid
Browne & 50 states in the USA Flood insurance pene- + (***)
Hoyt (2000) over a period of 10 years tration on state level
Botzen et al. 494 homeowners in Stated willingness - (**)
(2009) the Dutch river delta to buy sandbags
Botzen & 982 homeowners in Purchase of (2012a) and - (***)
van den Bergh the Dutch river delta WTP for (2012b) flood
(2012a, 2012b) insurance in a hypothetical
choice experiment
Raschky et al. 220 flood affected Stated WTP for and - (***)
(2013) homeowners in Austria uptake of flood insurance
and Germany
Seifert et al. 144 flood affected Stated WTP for No effect
(2013) households in Germany flood insurance
Petrolia et al. 805 homeowners Uptake of flood + (**)
(2013) at Gulf coast, USA insurance
Petrolia et al. 238 (insurance) and Uptake of wind insurance No effect
(2015) 829 (mitigation) home- and protection measures
owners at Gulf coast, USA
Osberghaus 4,272 households Uptake of flood + (*)
(2015) in Germany protection measures
Kousky et al. 8,315 zip-code areas Average flood insurance - (*) for average
(2017) in Florida, USA coverage and uptake coverage;
over a period of 10 years No effect
for uptake
This table lists studies that quantify the effect of governmental aid on household’s insurance and protection
behavior in response to natural hazards. Note: ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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dication of charity hazard,3 opposite findings are partly explained as correlations and
not as causal relationships (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Osberghaus, 2015). If an unobserved
variable, such as flood exposure, increases both the engagement in flood precaution
as well as governmental relief, a positive correlation may be estimated. Petrolia et al.
(2013) provide a further explanation for their counterintuitive finding: They measure
government relief as the stated assessment of the respondent to be eligible for govern-
mental aid, which might be confounded as respondents, who are really dependent on
governmental aid, are ashamed to admit this.
Finally, some studies mention heterogeneities regarding charity hazard: Raschky
et al. (2013) emphasize that a higher degree of institutionalization of government relief
increases the charity hazard significantly. Kousky et al. (2017) find that type and mag-
nitude of governmental relief matter. While they find no effect of the disbursement of
low-interest disaster loans, non-refundable grants do affect insurance demand. The di-
rection, however, depends on the amount of the grant: Low payments seem to increase
the purchase of insurance coverage, while larger grants crowd out private demand.
Petrolia et al. (2013) report a significant positive relationship between governmental
relief and private precaution only for homeowners near the coastline, which the au-
thors take as a proxy for flood exposure. In a relatively large cross-sectional survey
of a nationally representative sample of German households, Osberghaus (2015) finds
differing results for subsamples of the population, depending i.a. on homeownership
and education.
We contribute to the empirical research on charity hazard in the following dimen-
sions: First, we examine heterogeneities in the different forms of precautionary mea-
sures, namely flood insurance uptake and non-financial flood protection measures.
We are not aware of any study that analyzes the different role of governmental aid
for these two strategies. Moreover, we differentiate the analysis of charity hazard by
objective flood risk. While other studies (e.g. Petrolia et al., 2013) controlled for flood
risk, we analyze the relationship between charity hazard and flood risk. Finally, by
3Another possible rationale could be reverse causality, since more insurance penetration leads to less
financing by the state and in turn to less expectancy of governmental aid (Kousky et al., 2017).
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focusing on Germany, we analyze flood insurance uptake in one of the few countries
where a flood insurance market exists and flood coverage is not bundled to other ma-
jor hazards, such as fire or storm (Lamond & Penning-Rowsell, 2014).
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
We draw on two nation-wide household surveys conducted in 2012 and 2014 that
were part of a project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search (BMBF). We developed questionnaires and commissioned the professional sur-
vey institute forsa to carry out data collection. forsa maintains a panel of more than
10,000 households that is representative of the German-speaking population and col-
lects the data using a state-of-the-art tool that allows panelists to fill out the question-
naire using either a television or the internet.4 From October 4 to November 4, 2012,
6,404 household heads completed the first survey. The second survey was completed
by 6,602 household heads between June 13 and July 30, 2014, yielding a total sample
size of 13,006 completed questionnaires. For our analysis, we restrict the sample to
homeowners, as tenants usually do not have the choice to take up flood insurance or
to install further protection measures. Furthermore, we reduce the sample to house-
holds who either live on the ground floor or have a basement, as these are potentially
exposed to floods. This leaves us with a sample size of 6,100 observations. Of those
homeowners participating in the first survey, 2,506 also participated in the second pe-
riod, a survey feature that is accounted for by clustering standard errors at the house-
hold level.
We are interested in the relationship between the household’s beliefs in govern-
mental aid after the occurence of a natural disaster and their privately conducted pre-
cautionary measures. The first dependent variable under scrutiny is whether a house-
hold possesses a flood insurance (insured). In Germany, homeowners can include flood
4Information on the underlying questionnaires and a summary of the descriptive results are avail-
able at the project homepage: www.rwi-essen.de/eval-map. Further information on forsa and its house-
hold panel is available at: www.forsa.com.
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coverage in their conventional home insurance for storm and fire hazard, for the price
of paying an extra premium. In our survey, almost 70% of the participants indicated to
be insured against flood damages (Table 2). This is a relatively high number compared
to data reported by the insurance industry. According to GDV (2016), around 35% of
German households were flood insured in 2014. Hence, it is possible that a consider-
able share of respondents expects insurance coverage without actually being insured
in case of a flood. This imprecision in the self-reported insurance status, however, is
unproblematic as long as there is no systematic correlation of trust in governmental
aid and flawed insurance reporting. Moreover, we find a negative correlation between
trusting in governmental aid and indicating to be insured only for households living
in flood-prone areas. As these respondents face a certain probability of actually being
affected by a flood, we argue that they are better informed about their actual level of
insurance. Consequently, the overestimation of insurance coverage might be less of a
problem in this subsample.
In addition to the uptake of flood insurance, we investigate the implementation
of (technical and behavioral) non-financial flood protection measures. Therefore, the
second dependent variable of our analysis (protection) captures the self-reported imple-
mentation of such measures and is a dummy variable indicating whether a household
has implemented at least one of six flood protection measures. Table 2 depicts these six
measures (M1-M6) and the shares of respondents having realized them. The portfo-
lio of measures is inspired by the literature on flood protection measures in Germany
(Bubeck et al., 2013) and covers three categories, namely adapted use (M1), flood bar-
riers (M2-M3) and structural measures (M4-M6). The last row of Table 2 indicates that
around 49% of the households have implemented at least one protection measure.5
Our two key explanatory variables are the trust in governmental aid and the ob-
jective flood risk of the household. The former is directly asked in the questionnaire.
Participants indicated from whom they expect financial aid in case of being affected
by a flood and could mark, amongst others, public institutions as well as charity orga-
5As a robustness check, we also conducted the analysis with the specific measures and measure
categories. This does not lead to further or contradictory conclusions.
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Table 2: Dependent variables: shares of homeowners reporting flood insurance and non-
financial protection measures
Variable Explanation Share (in %) N
insured Dummy: Owns flood insurance 68.8 5,606
M1 Dummy: No valuables stored in basement 6.8 5,444
M2 Dummy: Water barriers at basement openings 4.6 5,378
M3 Dummy: Installation of back flow flaps 32.9 5,840
M4 Dummy: Water-repellent exterior paint 14.4 5,795
M5 Dummy: Water-repellent interior paint 3.6 5,858
M6 Dummy: Water-repellent basement floor 15.7 5,935
protection Dummy: Any of the six non-financial protection measures 48.6 5,789
nizations. If respondents indicated one of those, we coded them as trusting in charity
(trust). Table 3 reveals that this is true for 28.7% of homeowners in our sample. Note
that trust is elicited on the individual household level, and not on an aggregated (coun-
try or regional) level. As the decision for precautionary measures is also met on the
household level, we see this as a strength of our analysis.
To control for the objective risk of being affected by a flood, we collected data from
the environmental offices of the federal states and the German Federal Institute for
Hydrology (BfG, 2015). These institutions measure riverine flood risks on a four-point
scale, distinguishing areas with either no flood risk or a flood return period of either
200, 100, or 20 years. For our purpose, we combined the different risk areas and created
a dummy variable indicating a positive flood risk. In fact, 7.5% of the respondents face
at least a flood return period of 200 years at their place of residence (Table 3).
In Germany, the share of flood-insured households varies considerably among fed-
eral states. This is often anecdotically traced back to the fact that in some federal states
flood insurances were mandatory in the past or per default included in the cover-
age of home insurances (e.g. GDV, 2016; Thieken et al., 2006). We therefore include the
dummy variable ex-mandatory that indicates whether the household is located in a fed-
eral state, where flood insurance was mandatory or by law included in the standard
home insurance in the past. This is true for East German states, as in the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic the home insurance always covered flood-related damages.
These policies were taken over by a private insurance company after reunification in
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Table 3: Explanatory and control variables
Variable Explanation Mean N
trust Dummy: 1 if respondent trusts in charity 0.287 6,077
floodprone Dummy: 1 if respondent lives in flood-prone area 0.075 6,060
ex-mandatory Dummy: 1 if respondent lives in a federal state 0.277 6,100
with former mandatory flood insurance
experience Dummy: 1 if respondent experienced a flood 0.384 6,100
without personal damage
damage Dummy: 1 if respondent suffered from flood damage 0.143 6,100
female Dummy: 1 if respondent is female 0.262 6,100
age Age of respondent 55.51 6,100
college Dummy: 1 if respondent has college preparatory degree 0.319 6,100
lowincome Dummy: 1 if household income per month < 2000 EUR 0.134 6,100
middleincome Dummy: 1 if household income per month 2000− 4000 EUR 0.487 6,100
highincome Dummy: 1 if household income per month > 4000 EUR 0.379 6,100
t Dummy: 1 if observation in second wave of survey 0.535 6,100
Note: Including income as continuous variable or using different income categories does not change our findings.
1990. Furthermore, the state of Baden-Württemberg imposed a mandatory flood in-
surance until 1994 (Arendt, 2013).
We further control for past experience with floods, as this is found to be a major
driver of flood insurance purchase and protection behavior (e.g. Atreya et al. 2015;
Osberghaus, 2017). In contrast to previous studies, we distinguish between the mere
flood experience without personal damage and households that suffered financial or
health-related flood damage. While 38% of the respondents have experienced a flood
without suffering damage, 14% have experience with flood-related personal damage.
Finally, we control for socio-economic variables, including gender, age, education
and household’s income (Table 3). The low share of females in our sample of 26% is
due to the design of the underlying survey, where household heads were asked to fill
in the questionnaire, as they usually decide upon financial and technical matters, such
as insurance uptake and flood protection measures.
First empirical insights on the connection between the two dependent variables
and the key explanatory variables described above can be derived from Table 4, which
depicts pairwise correlations. First, the two precautionary strategies insured and pro-
tection are positively correlated, indicating a complementary rather than substitutional
relation. Trust in governmental aid is positively correlated with both precaution strate-
gies, which suggests that charity hazard is difficult to detect for the full sample. The
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Table 4: Pairwise correlations of dependent and key explanatory variables
insured protection trust floodprone
protection 0.084**
trust 0.029* 0.034*
floodprone 0.009 0.053** 0.031*
experience 0.019 -0.005 0.006 0.027
damage 0.037** 0.190** 0.011 0.051**
N 5240
Note: **,* denote statistical significance at the 1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
mere experience with floods is not correlated with precautionary behavior, but the
experience of flood-related damage is positively related to both dependent variables.
Furthermore, living in flood-prone areas is significantly correlated with damage expe-
rience, trust in governmental aid and the implementation of non-financial protection
measures. Hence, objective flood risk is an important control variable, as it may affect
both trust and precautionary behavior.
For a more rigorous empirical analysis, we estimate probit models due to the bi-
nary nature of the dependent variables, and, as robustness checks, logit and linear
(OLS) models as well as a random-effects probit exploiting the panel nature of the
data. Specifically, we analyze the uptake of private flood insurance (Case A) and the
implementation of non-financial protection measures (Case B) and report for each de-
pendent variable three different model specifications. First, we regress the precau-
tionary strategy (either insurance uptake or non-financial protection measures) on the
dummy variable capturing the individual’s trust in governmental relief, and control
variables. In the second specification, we additionally control for flood risk and in-
clude an interaction term to derive heterogeneous effects of trust in governmental re-
lief depending on flood risk. Finally, to consider possible correlations between the two
precautionary strategies, insurance uptake and non-financial protection measures, we
estimate Specification 3 including the respective alternative precautionary strategy:
y∗i = β1trusti + β2 f loodpronei + β3trusti × f loodpronei + β4yci + γTxi + δti + ei (1)
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where y∗i designates the precautionary strategy under scrutiny (in Case A insurance
uptake, insured, and in Case B the implementation of non-financial protection mea-
sures, protection) of respondent i, trust indicates whether a household expects govern-
mental relief, f loodprone is a dummy variable capturing whether the household lives
in an area with a flood return period of less than 200 years, and yc denotes the alterna-
tive precautionary strategy (the implementation of non-financial protection measures,
protection, in Case A, and the insurance uptake, insured, in Case B). x is a vector of all
further control variables depicted in Table 3, superscript T denotes the transposition
of a vector, t is a dummy indicating the second survey wave, β, γ and δ are the param-
eters to be estimated and e denotes the error term. We estimate and report marginal
effects averaged over observations, while the reported significance levels are based on
the estimated coefficients of the probit models, as suggested by Greene (2007: E18-23,
2010: 292).
Due to our rich data set, we are able to observe both precautionary strategies and
their relationship with each other. In particular, we control for the (endogenous) al-
ternative precautionary strategy in Specification 3 to test if the general conclusions
in regard to charity hazard change. For instance, a finding of a charity hazard could
simply be due to the ommitance of the alternative precautionary strategy. While our
results should be interpreted as correlations and have no causal inference, as typical
for most empirical studies of charity hazard (e.g. Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Petrolia et al.,
2013, 2015), they offer interesting new insights.
4 Results
First, we present results for all three specifications regarding flood insurance up-
take (Case A), focusing on the existence of charity hazard (Table 5).6 In Specification
1, without controlling for objective flood risk and non-financial protection measures,
6Estimation coefficients can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Furthermore, all main results are
confirmed by the robustness checks using logit, OLS and random-effects probit regressions, see Table
A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Marginal effects of probit estimation on flood insurance uptake (Case A)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
trust 0.019 0.021* 0.017
floodprone — 0.014 0.014
trust × floodprone — -0.112* -0.121*
protection — — 0.078**
ex-mandatory 0.176** 0.172** 0.174**
experience 0.029* 0.030* 0.025
damage 0.057** 0.057** 0.035
female -0.008 -0.007 -0.003
age -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
college -0.043** -0.042** -0.043**
middleincome 0.040 0.041 0.024
highincome 0.074** 0.074** 0.053*
t 0.007 0.007 0.007
N 5,586 5,549 5,240
Note: **,* denote statistical significance at the 1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
trust in governmental relief has no bearing on insurance uptake providing no indica-
tion of charity hazard. In Specification 2, including a flood risk dummy as well as an
interaction term with trust in governmental relief, we find a significant negative rela-
tionship between trust in governmental relief and insurance uptake for households in
flood-prone areas. The results suggest that governmental aid and flood insurance are
substitutes for those individuals who actually face an objective flood risk. Specifically,
the probability of taking up flood insurance reduces by approximately 9.1 percentage
points (0.021-0.112=-0.091) , revealing a substantial charity hazard.7 This main result
is confirmed by Specification 3, where we additionally control for the implementation
of non-financial protection measures.
Specification 3 moreover reveals – in line with Hudson et al. (2017) and Petrolia
et al. (2015) – a positive correlation between insurance uptake and further protection
measures. This finding suggests that households tend to perceive both flood precau-
tion measures, the uptake of an insurance and the implementation of non-financial
7Note that the positive effect of trust in governmental relief for households outside flood-prone
areas is not robust since it is only significant in Specification 2. Hence, we will not further interpret this
correlation.
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protection measures, as complements, rather than substitutes. Accordingly, we find
no indication of careless behavior of insured households and thus no evidence that
the possession of an insurance causes a moral hazard.
Furthermore, the probability of being insured is substantially higher in federal
states where flood insurance was the default coverage in home insurance contracts
until the early 90’s. This finding was previously mentioned in descriptive terms (e.g.
by Thieken et al., 2006), but to our knowledge has never been analyzed in a multivari-
ate regression model. As we control for several observable characteristics, i.a. flood
risk and income, we interpret this finding as a hint on status-quo bias (see Samuelson
& Zeckhauser, 1988), according to which individuals remain in their insurance status
due to habit, even though other insurance options become available or – as in the case
of Baden-Württemberg – legal compulsion ceased to apply. This result is the first ev-
idence for status-quo bias in the natural disaster insurance context and adds to the
literature on status-quo bias in other markets (Frank & Lamiraud, 2009; Johnson et al.,
1993; Krieger & Felder, 2013; Salkeld et al., 2000).
The results in Table 5 show further determinants of insurance uptake, which are
broadly in line with the literature. First, experience with flood events increases the
probability of owning flood insurance. If the respondent suffered from personal dam-
age, this effect is even more pronounced. However, including the implementation of
non-financial protection measures in Specification 3 renders these effects statistically
insignificant, due to a high correlation between flood experience and non-financial
protection measures. Furthermore, a higher income affects insurance uptake posi-
tively. There are significant correlations of insurance uptake with age and education,
indicating a lower probability of flood insurance uptake for elderly individuals as well
as respondents who hold a college preparatory degree.
In contrast to the uptake of flood insurance, we do not find an indication of char-
ity hazard for the implementation of non-financial protection measures (Case B). In-
deed, we derive in all three specifications a positive correlation between non-financial
14
Table 6: Marginal effects of probit estimation on non-financial protection measures (Case B)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
trust 0.047** 0.047** 0.047**
floodprone — 0.070* 0.073*
trust × floodprone — 0.012 0.013
insured — — 0.090**
ex-mandatory -0.022 -0.020 -0.038*
experience 0.069** 0.068** 0.063**
damage 0.293** 0.293** 0.288**
female 0.025 0.023 0.025
age 0.003** 0.003** 0.004**
college -0.006 -0.005 0.009
middleincome 0.078** 0.079** 0.065**
highincome 0.110** 0.109** 0.105**
t 0.020 0.019 0.022*
N 5,767 5,728 5,240
Note: **,* denote statistical significance at the 1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
protection measures and trust in governmental relief (Table 6).8 Accordingly, our re-
sults suggest that the trust in governmental aid does not harm the implementation of
non-financial protection measures. We do not find heterogeneous effects in regard to
different flood risks.
Additionally, we find a strong impact of flood experience on the implementation of
non-financial protection measures (as shown by Bubeck at al., 2012 and Osberghaus,
2017). The mere experience without personal damage increases the probability of im-
plementing non-financial protection measures by around 6-7 percentage points. If the
respondent suffered from personal damage this effect increases to around 29 percent-
age points. An explanation for this distinct impact on precautionary behavior might
be a higher risk perception of individuals with flood experience as shown by Frondel
et al. (2017). As expected, respondents in flood-prone areas are more likely to conduct
non-financial protection measures. Finally, older respondents as well as households
with a higher income have a higher probability to conduct these measures.
8Estimation coefficients can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix. Furthermore, all main results are
confirmed by the robustness checks using logit, OLS and random-effects probit regressions, see Table
A4 in the Appendix.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
Drawing on rich survey data from German homeowners, we examine the determi-
nants of flood insurance uptake and the implementation of technical and behavioral
(i.e. non-financial) flood protection measures. We particularly focus on the effect of
governmental relief expectations in case of a flood. Many theoretical works suggest
charity hazard, i.e. a negative effect of governmental relief on insurance uptake and
non-financial protection behavior. However, prior empirical findings are surprisingly
ambiguous.
Regarding charity hazard for insurance uptake, we contribute results that are dif-
ferentiated by the household’s objective flood risk level: While there is no significant
correlation for households in low risk areas, homeowners in flood-prone regions tend
to forgo insurance coverage if they expect governmental relief in case of a flood dam-
age. These households seem to perceive financial payments from the government and
from insurance companies as substitutes. In fact, due to eligibility criteria governmen-
tal aid and insurance payouts are mutually exclusive.
When it comes to the implementation of non-financial protection measures, we
find a positive correlation with governmental relief expectations. Hence, households
perceive relief payments and the benefits of technical or behavioral flood protection as
complements. Indeed, the kind of benefits of governmental aid and non-financial pro-
tection measures are quite different: While relief payments can only alleviate financial
hardships, protection measures can also reduce physical damages. Moreover, the im-
plementation of non-financial protection measures has no influence on the eligibility
for governmental aid.
Furthermore, we find that insurance uptake and non-financial protection measures
are complements and thus can work well together in reducing household vulnera-
bility towards flood damages. As insured households conduct additional protection
measures, this might relax the concern over moral hazard in the flood insurance mar-
ket. Finally, our results indicate for the first time in a multivariate setting (controlling
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i.a. for flood risk) the existence of a status-quo bias for flood insurance uptake, as the
insurance rate is still significantly higher in regions where flood coverage was histori-
cally the default for home insurance contracts.
As is typical for empirical studies of charity hazard (e.g. Browne & Hoyt, 2000;
Petrolia et al., 2013, 2015), our results should be interpreted as correlations and have no
causal inference. Nevertheless, our results allow us to draw some important conclu-
sions for policy makers and future research in this area. As our findings suggest a char-
ity hazard only for the uptake of insurance, it seems crucial to differentiate between
precautionary strategies, in particular between insurance and non-financial protection
measures. For a better understanding of a potential charity hazard, it is furthermore
important to focus on regional effects. A distinctive feature of our study is the anal-
ysis of the heterogeneous effects regarding the different flood risks between regions:
Our results indicate charity hazard only for individuals in flood-prone regions. Yet, to
understand the ambigious empirical results so far, it seems important to take also the
institutional settings into account (cf. Raschky et al., 2013). While our results make
sense for Germany (given that governmental aid is conditioned on being not insured),
the seemingly contradictory empirical results for the USA (Petrolia et al., 2013) might
be explained by the fact that flood insurance is mandatory in the US for a considerable
percentage of households in flood-prone areas.
For Germany, our analysis suggests that unconditional financial relief for unin-
sured households in the aftermath of natural disasters provides disincentives for pri-
vate insurance uptake. However, due to political considerations, the government can
hardly commit not to assist needy households (Coate, 1995). In order to find strate-
gies that reduce adverse side-effects of governmental relief, future research could as-
sess, for instance, the potential effects of mandatory flood insurance, the possibilities
to make relief payments conditional on or combinable with private insurance, and the
prospects of intensified information and awareness campaigns on natural disaster risk
perception and adequate precautionary measures.
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Appendix
Table A1: Coefficients of probit estimation on flood insurance uptake (Case A)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
trust 0.055 (0.042) 0.088* (0.044) 0.077 (0.045)
floodprone — 0.134 (0.094) 0.143 (0.096)
trust × floodprone — -0.328* (0.143) -0.355* (0.147)
protection — — 0.230** (0.041)
ex-mandatory 0.545** (0.048) 0.534** (0.048) 0.546** (0.050)
experience 0.085* (0.041) 0.088* (0.041) 0.073 (0.042)
damage 0.169** (0.059) 0.168** (0.059) 0.103 (0.062)
female -0.023 (0.047) -0.020 (0.048) -0.008 (0.050)
age -0.005** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002)
college -0.126** (0.044) -0.122** (0.045) -0.125** (0.046)
middleincome 0.113 (0.059) 0.116 (0.059) 0.071 (0.061)
highincome 0.214** (0.064) 0.215** (0.064) 0.156* (0.066)
t 0.021 (0.031) 0.021 (0.031) 0.022 (0.032)
N 5,586 5,549 5,240
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the
1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
Table A2: Results of logit, OLS and random-effects probit estimation on flood insurance uptake
(Case A)
logit OLS random-effects
marginal effects coefficients marginal effects
trust 0.016 0.025 0.017
floodprone 0.014 0.048 0.008
trust × floodprone -0.122* -0.121* -0.110*
protection 0.078** 0.078** 0.068**
ex-mandatory 0.172** 0.175** 0.170**
experience 0.024 0.025 0.026*
damage 0.035 0.035 0.030
female -0.003 -0.002 -0.006
age -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
college -0.043** -0.042** -0.045**
middleincome 0.025 0.024 0.031
highincome 0.054* 0.054* 0.059**
t 0.008 0.008 0.005
N 5,240 5,240 5,240
Note: Marginal effects are averaged over observations. **,* denote statistical significance at the
1 % and 5 % level, respectively. Statistical significance for the logit and the random-effects probit
estimations are infered from estimation coefficients (not depicted) (cf. Greene, 2007:E18-E23, 2010:292)
18
Table A3: Coefficients of probit estimation on non-financial protection measures (Case B)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
trust 0.122** (0.039) 0.120** (0.041) 0.121** (0.044)
floodprone — 0.174* (0.087) 0.182* (0.092)
trust × floodprone — 0.034 (0.139) 0.036 (0.149)
insured — — 0.236* (0.042)
ex-mandatory -0.057 (0.044) -0.053 (0.044) -0.101* (0.046)
experience 0.176** (0.038) 0.174** (0.038) 0.161** (0.040)
damage 0.770** (0.056) 0.773** (0.056) 0.765** (0.058)
female 0.066 (0.045) 0.060 (0.045) 0.065 (0.048)
age 0.008** (0.002) 0.009** (0.002) 0.009** (0.002)
college -0.015 (0.042) -0.012 (0.042) 0.007 (0.044)
middleincome 0.205** (0.057) 0.207** (0.057) 0.172** (0.061)
highincome 0.288** (0.061) 0.287** (0.061) 0.276** (0.065)
t 0.053 (0.028) 0.051 (0.029) 0.059* (0.030)
N 5,767 5,728 5,240
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the
1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
Table A4: Results of logit, OLS and random-effects probit estimation on non-financial protec-
tion measures (Case B)
logit OLS random-effects
marginal effects coefficients marginal effects
trust 0.047** 0.046** 0.042**
floodprone 0.073* 0.069* 0.073*
trust × floodprone 0.014 0.011 0.005
insured 0.090** 0.090** 0.077**
ex-mandatory -0.039* -0.039* -0.042*
experience 0.063** 0.063** 0.064**
damage 0.288** 0.287** 0.268**
female 0.025 0.025 0.026
age 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
college 0.003 0.002 0.001
middleincome 0.065** 0.065** 0.048*
highincome 0.104** 0.104** 0.092**
t 0.022 0.022 0.022*
N 5,240 5,240 5,240
Note: Marginal effects are averaged over observations. **,* denote statistical significance at the
1 % and 5 % level, respectively. Statistical significance for the logit and the random-effects probit
estimations are infered from estimation coefficients (not depicted) (cf. Greene, 2007:E18-E23, 2010:292)
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